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Unexpected questionThe development of episodic memory in children has been of inter-
est to researchers for more than a century. Current behavioral tests
that have been developed to assess episodic memory differ sub-
stantially in their surface features. Therefore, it is possible that
these tests are assessing different memory processes. In this study,
106 children aged 3 to 6 years were tested on four putative tests of
episodic memory. Covariation in performance was investigated in
order to address two conﬂicting hypotheses: (a) that the high level
of difference between the tests will result in little covariation in
performance despite their being designed to assess the same abil-
ity and (b) that the conceptual similarity of these tasks will lead to
high levels of covariation despite surface differences. The results
indicated a gradual improvement with age on all tests.
Performances on many of the tests were related, but not after con-
trolling for age. A principal component analysis found that a single
principal component was able to satisfactorily ﬁt the observed
data. This principal component produced a marginally stronger
correlation with age than any test alone. As such, it might be con-
cluded that different tests of episodic memory are too different to
be used in parallel. Nevertheless, if used together, these tests may
offer a robust assessment of episodic memory as a complex multi-
faceted process.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).
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Six blind men wanted to discover for themselves the nature of an elephant. Each one went to the
elephant and touched it. The ﬁrst touched the elephant’s leg and said ‘‘it is like a tree,’’ the second
touched the elephant’s tail and said ‘‘it is like a rope,’’ the third touched the elephant’s trunk and
said ‘‘it is like a snake,’’ the fourth touched the elephant’s tusk and said ‘‘it is like a spear,’’ the ﬁfth
touched the elephant’s side and said ‘‘it is like a wall,’’ and the sixth touched the elephant’s ear and
said ‘‘it is like a fan.’’
[Ancient Indian fable]Characterizing healthy episodic memory development in young children is important because it
allows problems with memory to be identiﬁed and informs appropriate educational strategies.
Although the development of memory in children has been studied for nearly a century, to date there
is considerable variation in the methodologies used to do so. The fable of the six blind men and the
elephant serves to warn us that a single perspective on an intangible phenomenon may provide truth
but can also be misleading. As psychologists, we can never directly assess psychological processes but
can only measure performance on particular tests that are thought to rely on those processes.
Different tests of episodic memory stem from different philosophical, theoretical, and empirical ori-
gins, and they differ substantially in the outward behavior they assess. Such eclecticism can be both
a strength and a weakness. A range of testing methodologies can allow triangulation on a single com-
mon feature. This may allow production of a battery of measures that provides a more complete pic-
ture of a psychological process. However, a range of tests that vary largely in their methodologies may
merely muddy any possible interpretation.
In this study, the same sample of 3- to 6-year-old children was tested on a range of episodic
memory tests. These tests are all very different in their surface features, so it might be predicted
that they would produce different results. Nevertheless, they all putatively assess the same under-
lying cognitive ability, and as such it might instead be predicted that there should be a demonstra-
ble association among them, reﬂecting this latent variable. The tests we chose to investigate are
some of those that have been claimed to tap episodic memory or are candidates for such a claim.
Therefore, we should expect to see a similar developmental change in all of the tests (Wellman,
Cross, & Watson, 2001). In the following section, we brieﬂy review the literature concerning these
tasks.
Free and cued recall
Free and cued recall paradigms involve learning a series of items (words or pictures) and then later
being asked to recall them, either with (cued) or without (free) external cues such as category words
to aid recollection. Freely recalled items are more likely to be reported as ‘‘remembered’’ rather than as
‘‘known’’ compared with cued items (Tulving, 1985) and, therefore, are considered to be more reliant
on episodic memory. Both free recall and cued recall improve between 3 and 8 years of age, with chil-
dren of all ages reliably ﬁnding cued recall to be the easier of the two (Naito, 2003; Perner & Ruffman,
1995; Sluzenski, Newcombe, & Ottinger, 2004).
What–Where–When
TheWhat–Where–When test requires participants to remember the time and location of a particular
event. Clayton and Dickinson (1998) argued that this requires an integrated spatiotemporal represen-
tation of the event, which corresponds to Tulving and colleagues’ deﬁnition of episodic memory
(Tulving, 1972). TheWhat–Where–When test produces cross-sectional developmental patterns similar
to those of other tests, with improvements between 2.5 and 5 years of age (Burns, Russell, & Russell, in
press; Hayne & Imuta, 2011; Newcombe, Balcomb, Ferrara, Hansen, & Koski, 2014; Russell, Cheke,
Clayton, & Meltzoff, 2011).
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Source memory tests assess retention of the context of an event rather than its focal targets
(Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Here, participants are required to report not only what was learned
but also (and unexpectedly) on the details of the context in which the learning occurred. Zentall and
colleagues argued that deliberate encoding reduces the contribution of episodic memory, and thus
only a question that is unexpected requires an individual to episodically reexperience the original
event (Zentall, Clement, Bhatt, & Allen, 2001; Zentall, Singer, & Stagner, 2008). However, Ornstein,
Haden, and Elischberger (2006) argued that it is children’s growing competence with event recall that
translates into increasingly deliberate encoding. This would suggest that episodic memory develop-
ment may facilitate the later emergence of purposeful remembering (Cuvo, 1975). Thus, it is unclear
whether younger children may encode ‘‘expected’’ and ‘‘unexpected’’ items differently. Children under
5 years have, however, demonstrated very poor source memory (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002;
Gopnik & Graff, 1988; Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000).
Absent from our analysis in this article is a consideration of autobiographical memory reports.
However, to the extent that they require children to report on previous events, unexpected/source
memory tests can be viewed as similar in some ways to lab-based autobiographical/event memory
tests. Autobiographical memory has been studied extensively in young children (e.g., Fivush, 2014;
Goodman, Ogle, McWilliams, Narr, & Paz-Alonso, 2014; Reese, 2014). Much of this work has examined
children’s verbal recall of events during parent–child conversations (e.g., Burch, Austin, & Bauer, 2004;
Farrant & Reese, 2000; Haden, Ornstein, Rudek, & Cameron, 2009) and interviews elicited by experi-
menters (e.g., Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Fivush (2011) and Fivush and Nelson (2004) argued
for a distinction between episodic memory and autobiographical memory, suggesting that the former
should be characterized by the content of the memory, whereas the latter requires an additional layer
of cognitive sophistication. The current study took as its starting point this more ‘‘minimalist’’ view of
episodic memory (see also Clayton & Russell, 2009) and as such does not involve an assessment of
autobiographical memory.
In summary, the literature using different episodic memory tests suggests that performance on
each improves between 3 and 6 years of age. This may mean that these tests are able to produce con-
sistent developmental trajectories despite very different testing methodologies. However, establishing
comparable improvement in test performance throughout the preschool years is not sufﬁcient evi-
dence to conclude that a common cognitive process underlies performance on these different tasks.
After all, many cognitive (e.g., theory of mind, language) and non-cognitive (e.g., running speed,
height) factors improve over this period. What is required is an assessment of the degree to which per-
formances on these different tests are related within the same individuals. This type of investigation
has been carried out with respect to different tests of prospection, ﬁnding good correlation among
most tests (Atance & Jackson, 2009).
Here, 3- to 6-year-old children were presented with three putative tests of episodic memory
(What–Where–When, Unexpected Source Memory, and Free Recall) and one that is thought to rely
less on episodic memory than on semantic memory (Cued Recall) (Tulving, 1985). All of the memory
tests were designed to produce continuous data (not pass/fail). This enabled us to investigate whether
performances on these tests are correlated and whether they are able to hold together as a ‘‘battery’’ of
tests.Method
Participants
At total of 106 children between 36 and 83 months of age were recruited from schools and nurs-
eries in the Cambridge area of England. There were 27 3-year-olds (M = 42.3 months, SD = 3.6), 18 4-
year-olds (M = 53.67 months, SD = 3.5), 27 5-year-olds (M = 66.2 months, SD = 3.3), and 34 6-year-olds
(M = 76.7 months, SD = 2.7). The sample consisted of 49 girls and 57 boys (3-year-olds: 15 girls and 12
boys; 4-year-olds: 6 girls and 12 boys; 5-year-olds: 15 girls and 12 boys; 6-year-olds: 13 boys and 21
L.G. Cheke, N.S. Clayton / Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 137 (2015) 164–171 167girls). The study was approved by the Cambridge University psychological research ethics committee.
Informed written consent was received from parents before any child took part. Testing took place in
an empty room or in a quiet corner of a classroom in the school/nursery. The majority of the children
were native English speaking, Caucasian, and middle class, representative of the local area.
Procedure
As shown in Fig. 1, the study had a nested design in which elements of each test described here
formed the retention intervals for the other tests.
Free Recall and Cued Recall
In both recall tasks, children were shown eight photos of familiar objects or animals (e.g., a book, a
horse) and were asked to name each one in turn. They were then told to look at the images and try to
remember what was in them. Recall occurred after a delay of approximately 5 min. In Free Recall chil-
dren were asked to tell the experimenter ‘‘what pictures had been on the cards,’’ whereas in Cued
Recall they were asked to tell the experimenter what pictures of speciﬁc categories (animals or toys)
had been on the cards. This methodology followed that of Perner and Ruffman (1995), but the images
were not the same.
What–Where–When
Fewer children took part in this task because children were split between this and another study
(not reported). As such, 68 children took part in this task (32 girls and 36 boys; 12 3-year-olds, 13
4-year-olds, 17 5-year-olds, and 26 6-year-olds). As shown in Fig. 2, children were given three pieces
of ‘‘gold treasure’’ (plastic £1 coins) and three pieces of ‘‘silver treasure’’ (plastic 20p coins) and asked
to hide them in two different trays (the ‘‘forest’’ and the ‘‘town’’). There were two hiding sessions sep-
arated by approximately 5 min. In each session, children could hide in only one tray. During hiding,
the experimenter highlighted each coin’s identity by saying, ‘‘Where are you going to hide that
[gold/silver] treasure?’’ After a delay (5–10 min), a new character (‘‘Mr. Crow’’) who had ‘‘stolen’’
a speciﬁc subset of the hidden coins was introduced; for example, the gold treasure from the second
hiding session had been stolen. Children were explicitly informed which treasure remained (e.g., ‘‘the
GOLD treasure from BEFORE we looked at cards’’). All elements of the treasure that was left (particu-
larly the ‘‘when’’ element) were described to children in a number of ways (e.g., ‘‘before,’’ ‘‘earlier,’’
‘‘ﬁrst,’’ ‘‘longer ago’’) to increase their chances of understanding what was being asked. Children were
then asked to indicate the location of the remaining treasure by pointing. Children could then swap
the coins for a sticker.Fig. 1. Schematic of experiment order. ‘‘Planning test’’ is an experiment reported elsewhere.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the What–Where–When test. The two locations were the ‘‘forest’’ (left) and the ‘‘town’’ (right), and the
items were ‘‘gold’’ and ‘‘silver’’ treasure. Items could be hidden under the pots, as illustrated at the bottom of the ﬁgure.
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One week after the ﬁrst stage of the experiment, children were unexpectedly asked about elements
of the ‘‘games’’ that had been played. The 11 questions concerned contextual details about the learning
episode. Both open-ended questions (e.g., ‘‘What animal stole the treasure in the pirate game?’’) and
cued-choice questions (e.g., ‘‘Which video had a teddy bear in it?’’) were asked. Some referred to
games children had played that day, and others referred to games they had played the previous week.
Results
Data were analyzed using Pearson’s and partial correlations to measure covariation among various
test performance. To assess whether performance on the different tests may reﬂect a single latent vari-
able, principal component analysis was used. Alpha was set at .05.
Preliminary analysis revealed no differences in performance between boys and girls, and therefore
gender was not considered in the main analyses. Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, and
range of scores for each age group on each of the tests.
As shown in Fig. 3, performance on all tests was positively associated with age. Table 2 indicates
the correlations with age as well as the associations among the tests.
Performances on many of the memory tests were related. The signiﬁcant correlation between
Unexpected Source Memory and Free Recall remained when Cued Recall was controlled (r = .317,
p = .02). The positive correlation between Free Recall and Cued Recall remained after age was con-
trolled. However, all of the other correlations were reduced to non-signiﬁcance when controlling
for age.
The central question of this study concerns whether different tests of episodic memory can be said
to be assessing the same underlying cognitive process. One way of addressing this is to examine the
extent to which an appropriately amalgamated score from all four tests (using the 68 children who
took part in all four tests) is able account for more variance than any of the tests on their own. This
was done in two stages, a covariance summary and then a prediction of a known relevant variable,
as a validation paradigm. A single principal component was produced by this analysis and had anTable 1
Mean performance, standard deviation and range of scores for each task for each age group.
Age (Years) Free Recall Cued Recall Unexpected Source What–Where–When
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range
3-Years .30 (.20) 0–.50 .33 (.26) 0–.75 .54 (.32) .10–.80 .28 (.28) 0–.67
4-Years .47 (.23) .125–1 .65 (.15) .50–1 .90 (.06) .80–1 .23 (.21) 0–.67
5-Years .52 (.17) .125–.75 .68 (.17) .375–1 .93 (.09) .80–1 .41 (.32) 0–1
6-Years .60 (.10) .375–.75 .78 (.14) .50–1 .95 (.08) .70–1 .47 (.30) 0–1
Fig. 3. Improvement on each task with age.
Table 2
Correlations among memory tests and between memory tests and age, with partial correlations controlling for age in parentheses.
Free Recall Cued Recall Unexpected Source What–Where–When
Age .539*** .632*** .617*** .268*
Free Recall – .544*** (.312***) .396*** (.105) .172 (.048)
Cued Recall – – .422*** (.066) .323** (.205)
Unexpected Source – – – .085 (.001)
Note. Numbers represent Pearson’s r values.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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and orthogonal rotation did not increase the eigenvalue of the second principal component over 1.10,
indicating a single underlying source of covariance in this dataset. Of the four tests, the What–Where–
When test loaded least well into this factor (.340). Finally, the principal component was then corre-
lated with age. This produced a marginally stronger correlation than any of the individual tests
(r = .699). This correlation was similar when dropping the weakest loading test (What–Where–
When) and re-extracting the ﬁrst principal component (r = .708).
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to investigate the consistency of a number of different tests puta-
tively assessing the same underlying psychological process, namely episodic memory. Performance on
each of the four tests was shown to improve gradually between 3 and 6 years of age, in line with pre-
vious literature (e.g., Hayne & Imuta, 2011; Naito, 2003; Reese, 2014). These tests differ in their surface
features but are conceptually similar in that all aim to assess episodic memory. As would be predicted
by this similarity, performances on many of the tests were correlated; however, few correlations
remained signiﬁcant after covariation due to age-related improvement being controlled. This result
demonstrates that these tests are not equivalent and should not be treated as so when assessing epi-
sodic memory in children. However, the principal component analysis suggests that a single underly-
ing factor may satisfactorily ﬁt the data. Thus, there may be mileage in adapting these tests with the
aim of reducing their surface differences and bringing them together into a single battery.
Nevertheless, there is still some distance to go before a satisfactory battery of episodic memory
tasks can be achieved. The tests used in this study were not designed to be methodologically similar;
rather, they were designed to represent the variation present between currently used tests. Therefore,
it is difﬁcult to identify what factors contribute to low levels of age-independent correlation. There are
many non-mnemonic cognitive and non-cognitive abilities that develop across the age range covered
here. Furthermore, the tests differed in the extent to which they required receptive and productive
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target’’ challenges. However, recent work with adults (Cheke & Clayton, 2013) shows that poor corre-
lations among these tests are present even during adulthood. This implies that development of extra-
target factors might not provide a full explanation for low covariation.
Each of the tests used in this study explicitly tests different mnemonic skills. The What–Where–
When test requires binding of spatiotemporal features. The Unexpected Source Memory task requires
the ability to reanalyze previous experiences for new information. The Free Recall task assesses the
ability to mentally initiate and guide retrieval in the absence of external cueing, and the Cued
Recall task requires the ability to use category words as retrieval cues. These different elements are
by no means the only important features of episodic memory: One limitation of this study is the
absence of a measure of these children’s autobiographical memory reports. Still, the tests employed
cover a range of different perspectives on the ‘‘deﬁning features’’ of episodic memory. Adaptation of
these types of test to facilitate the creation of a battery could provide beneﬁts that are greater than
the sum of it’s parts. Ultimately, it may allow the assessment of episodic memory as a whole without
undue emphasis on any one particular feature.
To summarize, this study revealed few associations for performance on different tasks putatively
assessing episodic memory among 3- to 6-year-old children when age was controlled. This suggests
that these tests are sufﬁciently different to lead to disparate results in studies across the episodic
memory literature. Nevertheless, it was also found that performance across the tasks was well
described by a single factor model. This may indicate that although the different tests are too different
to use independently as equivalent tests, the conceptual similarities are sufﬁcient to warrant their
adaptation to create an episodic memory battery. Like the blind men’s perspective of the elephant, this
would have informative powers above and beyond each individual test. Future work, therefore, should
focus on development of such a battery in which the tests are more methodologically matched but
remain structurally distinct. This battery might further include autobiographical reports and tests of
episodic foresight. In this way, researchers will be able to investigate episodic memory not only as
a coherent single process but also as a multifaceted one.
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